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Survey of Ohio Law-1960
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE
AGENCY JURISDICTION
A number of jurisdictional problems concerning agency hearings and
proceedings were before the courts during 1960.
The failure to raise the constitutional validity of a statute before the
Board of Tax Appeals created a situation which caused the supreme court1
to reaffirm the rule that an administrative agency has no jurisdiction to
determine the constitutional validity of a statute. This rule is predicated
upon a prior decision of the supreme court' which stated that it is the
duty of an administrative agency to proceed under and in accordance with
the terms and provisions of a statute with the assumption of its constitu-
tionality. The constitutionality of a statute is a question for the courts
and not for a board or commission.3
State ex rel. City of Dayton v. Kenealy4 considered the jurisdiction of
the Public Utilities Commission to hear a rate complaint and appeal. The
city of Dayton had by ordinance established gas rates, requiring the utility
to file a written acceptance which would constitute a contract, but pro-
viding that each provision was independent of every other provision. The
utility rejected the ordinance rates, and filed an appeal to the Public Utili-
ties Commission. The city contended that the rejection of the ordinance
rates made the ordinance void, and that there was nothing for the Com-
mission to consider. The supreme court, in denying a writ of prohibition
against the commission, held that the ordinance was valid and that it gave
rise to a rate dispute within the jurisdiction of the Commission.
A court of appeals decision 5 passed upon the jurisdiction of the State
Medical Board to hear a petition for reinstatement of a license after an
order revoking the license has become final. The appellant's license to
practice "hydrotherapy" had been revoked by the State Board in 1942.
It then denied his application for reinstatement of his certificate in 1957
and that action was affirmed on appeal to the court of common pleas.
1. S. S. Kresge Co. v. Bowers, 170 Ohio St. 405, 166 N.E.2d 139 (1960). See also discus-
sion in Constitutional Law section, p. 469 infra.
2. East Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 137 Ohio St. 225, 238-39, 28 N.X.2d 599,
600 (1940).
3. The issue of statutory constitutionality cannot be decided by an administrative agency, and
therefore it is not necessary to present that issue to the agency in laying a proper foundation
for appellate review.
4. 170 Ohio St. 320, 164 N.E.2d 400 (1960).
5. Application of Welsh, 111 Ohio App. 79, 165 NE.2d 658 (1960).
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The court of appeals affirmed the order because of the lack of jurisdic-
tion of the Ohio State Medical Board to consider appellant's application.
The court reasoned that the authority of the medical board is completely
circumscribed by statute, and that the applicable statutes' do not empower
it to reinstate,' but only to suspend or revoke a license based on the
grounds set out in the statutes and rules properly adopted by the board.
A board of county commissioners has legislative authority8 to adopt
regulations relative to construction in the unincorporated area of a
county only with respect to the safety, health, and sanitary conditions of
the buildings. The Commissioners of Mahoning County had adopted a
new Building Code of Unincorporated Areas of Mahoning County. This
Code required a person to obtain a license prior to the installation of warm
air heating equipment in the area. One Dardas applied for a license, and
it was denied. He then brought an action for an injunction in the court
of common pleas where the judge held that there was no power to pro-
vide for the licensing of heating contractors. The court of appeals af-
firmed.9 It adopted a rule of strict construction of the powers of the
board. It is a quasi-corporation of strictly limited powers - limited to
those powers granted by statute - and such powers are purely adminis-
trative, and not legislative. The court of appeals relied heavily upon a
supreme court decision concerning analogous powers of a county board
of health. 9 It also rejected the contention that an estoppel to question
the validity of the licensing measure arose from the application for the
license.
When an agency does have apparent jurisdiction under its statute, it
is entitled to proceed without interference from the courts. In denying
a writ of prohibition against the State Board of Examiners of Architects
acting on a certificate revocation proceeding, the court of appeals" indi-
cated that the writ could not be used to restrain action where a tribunal
6. OHIO REV. CODE §§ 4731.20, .22.
7. This was the second application for reinstatement. The first application occurred some-
time after the 1942 revocation. It was denied, and the petitioner invoked the original juris-
diction of the Ohio Supreme Court, asking the issuance of a writ of mandamus ordering a
restoration of his license. The writ was denied. Counsel for petitioner argued that the board
had an implied or cognate power of restitution. The court did not pass upon this argument
since it held that the writ could not command the performance of an act which is not especially
enjoined by law upon the board. State ex rel. Welsh v. Medical Board, 145 Ohio St. 74, 60
N.E.2d 620 (1945).
8. OHio REV. CODE § 307.37-.40.
9. Dardas v. Board of County Comm'rs, 168 N.E.2d 164 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
10. See Wetterer v. Board of Health, 167 Ohio St. 127, 146 N.E.2d 846 (1957). The
supreme court reversed a lower court decision which had determined that the county board of
health had implied power to license plumbers, holding that such a board has neither express
nor implied powers under its authorizing statutes to enact rules and regulations to provide
for the licensing of plumbers within the general health district.
11. State ex rel. Burchard v. Board of Examiners of Architects, 110 Ohio App. 286, 163
N.E.2d 391 (1959).
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has jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person, nor to prevent a
tribunal from deciding the issue erroneously.
The effect of an appeal on an agency's continuing jurisdiction will
depend on the agency's basic statute. Under its statute the Industrial
Commission is enjoined to make payments on an award even though an
appeal may be pending, and it is specifically stated that an appeal shall
not stay the payment. 2 The court of appeals granted a writ of mandamus
on application of a compensation complainant who had been successful
before the Commission, and its board of review. Under this statute the
appeal did not take the entire case out of the jurisdiction of the Commis-
sion, and it continued to have the power to complete the award by deter-
mining the amount and by ordering payment.'3
VALIDITY OF REGULATIONS
The Revised Code provisions 4 regulating Driver Training Schools
authorize the Director of Highway Safety to adopt and prescribe such
regulations concerning the administration and enforcement of the statute
as are necessary to protect the public. The Code'5 also authorizes the
director to call upon the state superintendent of public instruction for
assistance in developing and formulating the regulations. The director
meticulously followed the provisions of the Ohio Administrative Proce-
dure Act' 6 in the issuance of his rules and definitions applicable to Driver
Training Schools. The State Highway Patrol played an important part
in the preparation of the rules. Several interested parties challenged the
validity of some of the rules so issued. Specific grounds of attack in-
cluded a charge that there was a delegation of legislative power to the
director and also that he made an unauthorized subdelegation to the state
highway patrol. The court' upheld the regulations indicating that there
was a valid delegation of administrative power to the Director, and fur-
ther, that the utilization of the technical advice of the state highway
patrol in the preparation of the regulations was not a subdelegation at all.
In Schlenker v. Board of Health,'" a declaratory-judgment-plaintiff
challenged the validity of a pasteurization regulation of the county board.
12. Omo REv. CODE §§ 4123.513, .515.
13. State ex rel. Hatfield v. Industrial Comm'n, 165 N.E.2d 211 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
See also discussion in Workmen's Compensation section, p. 595 infra.
14. OHIo REv. CODE § 4508.01-.07.
15. OHno REv. CODE § 4508.02(B).
16. OHIo REv. CODE § 4508.02 subjects the director to the provisions of §§ 119.01-.13 in
his promulgation of regulations.
17. In re Adoption of Rules and Regulations Relative to Driver Training Schools, 165
N.E.2d 834 (Ohio C.P. 1958). See also discussion in Constitutional Law section, p. 472
infra.
18. 171 Ohio St. 23, 167 N.2d 920 (1960).
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This was a board of health of a general health district which has statutory
authority 9 to make such orders and regulations as are necessary for its
own government, for the public health, and for the prevention or restric-
tion of disease. The supreme court affirmed a judgment holding the
regulation to be valid. It stated that the regulation represented a proper
exercise of the police power of the board of health.
The constitutionality of an Ohio Turnpike Commission rule establish-
ing a maximum speed limit of sixty-five miles per hour came under at-
tack in a municipal court decision which held the rule unconstitutional.
The rule was promulgated under the Code authority" to enact rules and
regulations which it deems advisable for the control and regulation of
traffic on any turnpike project for the maintenance and preservation of
good order within the property under its control. There was a specific
exception of these rules and regulations from the general statutes dealing
with speed and other traffic matters. The court of appeals2 ' reversed the
trial court while upholding the validity of the rules and regulations as
coming dearly under the police power of the state.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE AGENCY
The Director of the Department of Liquor Control is required by the
regulations of the Board to set out in the notice of rejection of an appli-
cation his reasons for rejection and in addition shall "refer to the law or
rule directly involved." The denial by the director in the principal casem
did not give adequate reasons nor refer to the law or rule directly involved.
The court of appeals held that adherence to the board's rule is mandatory.
The failure to observe this requirement, among other reasons, caused the
court to affirm a decision of the court of common pleas reversing the
Board's order denying the renewal application.
An appeal from a Board of Liquor Control order revoking the permit
of a private club raises the interesting question of whether a hearing prior
to revocation is essential when a responsible officer of the club admitted
sales to a nonmember and also after hours sales. The court of appeals
affirmed23 the order of the court of common pleas which had affirmed
the Board's order. When the operative facts are admitted, there is no
reason for a hearing. Another decision describes the consequences of a
19. OHIO REV. CODE §S 3709.01, .22.
20. OHIO REV. CODE 5537.16.
21. State v. Cunningham, 168 N.E.2d 552 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960). See also discussion in
Constitutional Law section, p. 472 infra and in Criminal Law and Procedure section, pp.
489-90 infra.
22. Metro Tavern, Inc. v. Board of Liquor Control, 168 N.E.2d 323 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
23. Mahoning County Citizen's Club v. Board of Liquor Control, 110 Ohio App. 549, 170
N.E.2d 84 (1959). Since the licensee had had a long history of violations, the court also
concluded that the Board did not abuse its discretion in revoking the permit.
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plea of "guilty" upon the ability of the licensee to challenge the penalty
imposed by the Board for the violation.24  "The guilty plea" precludes
any finding that there was no substantial, reliable or probative evidence
to support the Board's finding, and under the circumstances the board has
the sole power of determining the penalty.25 The appellate court cannot
inquire into the issue of abuse of discretion.
An interesting common pleas decision involved the practice of law
before the Bureau of Workmen's Compensation.26 The court expressed
the view that one who for a fee, advises others as to their legal rights,
the method of enforcing the rights, the forum to be selected, and the
practice to be followed for the enforcement of these rights is engaged in
the practice of law. Specifically a person who appears before authorized
industrial commission personnel, prepares notices of appeal from their
rulings, and advises claimants as to their rights, in a representative capac-
ity in adversary proceedings where controversial questions are raised, is
engaged in the practice of law. The court considered the practice of some
large employers in maintaining an audit and claims procedure which
seeks to verify the cost of the Workmen's Compensation Act as they do
other costs of business. It concluded that an employer or a service or-
ganization which confines itself to the furnishing of facts from the rec-
ords relative to rates and classifications, without concern for their legal
effect, does not engage in the practice of law." The court suggested that
neither the administrative agency nor the legislature could define the
practice of law, asserting that it is solely within the power of the courts
to say what actions and conduct constitute the practice of law.28
EVIDENCE UNDER THE OHno ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
A tavern operator was cited for having violated the statute29 prohibit-
ing sales of liquor to an intoxicated person. The Board of Liquor Control
24. Tarpoff v. Board of Liquor Control, 110 Ohio App. 290, 169 N.E.2d 19 (1960).
25. The court relied upon the supreme court's decision in Henry's Cafe, Inc. v. Board of
Liquor Control, 170 Ohio St. 233, 163 N.E_2d 678 (1959) which held that the court of
common pleas had no power when its jurisdiction is derived from an appeal under the Ohio
Administrative Procedure Act to modify an order on the ground that the agency abused its
discretion. Under OHO REV. CODE § 119.12 its power to modify is limited to the ground set
forth therein - only upon a finding that the order is not supported by reliable, probative,
and substantial evidence.
26. MvcMillen v. McCahan, 167 NX..2d 541 (Ohio C.P. 1960). Defendant McCahan was
enjoined from the practice of law. See also discussion in Attorneys at Law section, p. 453
infra and in Workmen's Compensation section, p. 594 infra.
27. It pointed out that an actuary or an employee of a service organization who undertakes
to give advice on legal rights, who prepares papers, and otherwise acts in a representative ca-
pacity before the administrator, deputy administrator, or the industrial commission, or any
referees on behalf of a daimant, enters into the realm of the practice of law.
28. The court relied heavily upon the supreme court decision of Cuyahoga Abstract Title &
Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650 (1934) wherein the opinion discusses
the practice of law in some detail.
29. OmHo REV. CODE § 4301.22 (B).
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held a hearing, found that the charge was supported by evidence and his
license was suspended for fourteen days. The common pleas court held
on appeal that it was necessary to prove intent, and reversed in part be-
cause of a failure to establish that element. The court of appeals was of
a contrary opinion,"0 holding that the statute does not require proof of
intent, indicating that the statute is an absolute prohibition and ignorance
of the purchaser's intoxicated condition cannot be shown in defense."'
In passing upon an application for the renewal of a permit, the Di-
rector of Liquor Control resorted to police department records to secure
information concerning the manner in which the applicant had conducted
his business. The court of common pleas affirmed an administrative de-
nial of the permit renewal, and on the appeal to the court of appeals the
applicant contended that the decision was erroneous, in part, because the
Director considered inadmissible and incompetent evidence in reaching
his decision. In affirming the order, the court of appeals 2 declared that
the Director is not bound by the common-law rules of evidence in carry-
ing out his investigations in considering an application for either a permit
or a renewal.
Despite the decision in Corwin v. Board of Liquor Control," the prob-
lem of what is "reliable, probative, and substantial evidence" to support
a denial of a permit when the permittee's business establishment is with-
in five hundred feet of a church remains a problem. In a case decided
six days after the Corwin case, the Franklin County Common Pleas Court
affirmed a denial order which was based on evidence that religious faiths
did not approve of the use of intoxicants, and other evidence that indi-
cated that a problem of safety might exist should a permit be granted.
The court felt that the evidence was not a mere "naked objection," and
that the additional matter about safety was sufficient to bring the evidence
in support of the order within the category of reliable, probative and sub-
stantial evidence.34
30. Glen's Grill No. 3, Inc. v. Board of Liquor Control, 110 Ohio App. 509, 166 N.E.2d
399 (1959).
31. The court felt bound on the matter of scienter by the supreme court's decision in State
v. Morello, 169 Ohio St. 213, 158 N.B.2d 525 (1959).
32. Milenkovich v. Department of Liquor Control, 110 Ohio App. 121, 168 N.E.2d 903
(1959).
33. 170 Ohio St. 304, 164 N.E.2d 412 (1960), holding that a naked objection, by the au-
thorities in control of a church, school, library or playground within 500 feet of a proposed
permit premises, to the issuance of a permit did not alone constitute reliable, probative, or
substantial evidence to support the denial of a permit. See Culp, Administrative Law and
Procedure, Survey of Ohio Law - 1959, 11 WEST. RES. L. REV. 342 (1960).
34. Stager v. Board of Liquor Control, 169 N.E.2d 222 (Ohio C.P. 1960). In this case
representatives of four churches appeared before the Board. Two of them presented "naked
objections," but others objected that congregation members would be in the immediate vicinity
of persons indulging excessively in alcoholic beverages, that issuance of more permits would
not benefit the community, and that there were sufficient establishments already.
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JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER SPECIFIC STATUTES
The Revised Code 5 directs the method of appeal from the decisions
of boards of county commissioners under their regulation of construction
in unincorporated areas. An applicant who had requested and been de-
nied a license required by a construction regulation, brought an action for
injunction in the court of common pleas challenging the power of the
Board to issue a license. The Board attempted to challenge the jurisdic-
tion of a court of equity to hear the complaint because the applicant had
not first exhausted his statutory remedy by appeal from the Board. The
court of appeals3" rejected this ground of error, indicating that the action
was not started to overthrow, or appeal from, any order of the Board.
Since it is a direct attack on the power of the Board to issue the license,
it is not an appeal, and the doctrine of the exhaustion of administrative
remedies did not apply.
A common pleas decision considered the proper method of reviewing
a decision of a county zoning board of appeals in denying a petition for
a variance in a zoning provision because of hardship. The statute at the
present time does not provide for an appeal." The trial court held that
the zoning board of appeals acts in a judicial capacity, and, as such, its
rulings concerning zoning are considered final orders which are appeal-
able to the common pleas court."
In Kioker v. Mort39 a residence owner had appealed from a refusal
of the Hamilton County Rural Zoning Commission to grant his request
for a change of zone through the hierarchy of administrative bodies to
the county commissioners without success, and then appealed to the
court of common pleas. That court held that it had no jurisdiction to
hear the appeal. The court of appeals pointed out that the appellant
had two statutory bases for his appeal. These were the special statute'
granting an appeal to a person aggrieved by the decision of the board
of county commissioners in any case, and the general statute4' which pro-
vides for appeals from decisions of any agency of any political subdivision,
35. OHIo REv. CODE § 307.37.
36. Dardas v. Board of County Comm'rs, 168 N.E.2d 164 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
37. OHIo REV. CODE § 303.14, .15. Former Ohio Gen. Code § 3180-14 provided an ap-
peal. It was when the statute was in this form that Ohio State Students Trailer Park Coopera-
tive v. County of Franklin, 68 Ohio L. Abs. 569 (Ct. App. 1953), was decided.
38. Kanter v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 167 N.E.2d 678 (Ohio C.P. 1960). The court
does not cite any judicial or statutory authority for this position. Conceivably, it may have
been relying on OHIO REv. CoDE § 2305.01, establishing the civil jurisdiction of the common
pleas court. With equal propriety it could have relied on OHIo REv. CODE § 2506.01 (Supp.
1960). Since its basis of reversal was an abuse of discretion, the appeal could have been
predicated on either statute.
39. 165 N.E.2d 469 (Ohio Cr. App. 1959).
40. OHIO REV. CODE 5 307.56.
41. OHIo 1Ev. CODE 5 2506.01 (Supp. 1960).
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as a remedy in addition to any other appeal provided by law. Since the
only issue before the court was that of jurisdiction, there was no discus-
sion of which of these sections would actually support the appeal.
Another court of appeal's decision indicates that the general statute
which now provides for a review of administrative orders in the common
pleas court," contemplates a trial on the transcript of the administrative
action as in the case of a civil action, with power in the court to affirm,
reverse, vacate, or modify the order.43
Two decisions illustrate that an observance of the time limits fixed
for pre-appeal acts required in perfecting the appeals is necessary for the
court to exercise jurisdiction. This is true of both the thirty day period
for filing an application for rehearing before the Public Utilities Com-
mission as a basis for an appeal" and of the ten day period in which to
give the Board of Review of the Bureau of Unemployment Compensa-
tion notice of intent to appeal.45
In Connor v. Board of Review 6 the common pleas court reversed the
Board of Review on the ground that the findings of the Board were unlaw-
ful, unreasonable, arbitrary, against the manifest weight of the evidence
and contrary to law. This was a blanket statement of all of the reasons for
which the common pleas court may reverse, vacate, or modify the deci-
sion of the agency and render judgment. Otherwise it must affirm the
agency's decision." The court of appeals upon examining the whole
record found that there was abundant evidence to support the adminis-
trative decision. The lower court therefore was in error in disturbing
the agency's decision. If there is abundant evidence in the record, the
decision is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Hall v.
Tichenour" emphasizes the necessity of exhausting administrative reme-
dies before appealing from the decisions of the Board of Review of
the Bureau of Unemployment Compensation. It stresses the fact that
the statute49 only permits an appeal from a decision on rehearing. The
common pleas court has no jurisdiction to entertain an attempted appeal
from the original decision of the Board.
42. ibid.
43. Vlad v. Board of Zoning, 164 N.E.2d 797 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
44. Specialized Transp., Inc. v. Public Utilities Comn'n, 170 Ohio St. 539, 166 N.E.2d 753
(1960), construing OHIO REV. CODE § 4903.10.
45. Smith v. Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, 164 N.E.2d 599 (Ohio C.P. 1959),
construing OHIO REV. CODE 5 4141.28 (Supp. 1960).
46. 168 N.E.2d 591 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960). See also discussion in Social Security and Pub-
lic Welfare section, p. 556 infra.
47. OHIO REV. CODE § 4141.28.
48. 110 Ohio App. 480, 170 N.E.2d 480 (1960). See also discussion in Social Security and
Public Welfare section, p. 556 infra.
49. OHIO REV. CODE § 4141.28.
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REviEw BY MANDAMUS
As indicated in previous survey articles,"0 the writ of mandamus is
not a particularly useful procedural method for securing judicial review
of administrative decisions, but it has had considerable success in the area
of zoning board decisions. Two cases involving administrative zoning
decisions in nonconforming use situations, illustrate the value of judicial
review by mandamus rather than by the statutory appeal. State v. Bum-
garner5' involved an unusually large nonconforming use relative to a
forty-seven acre tract of land. The owner wanted to build on this property
without conforming to setback lines prescribed in the zoning resolution.
His application was denied. Instead of going by appeal to the common
pleas court he filed a mandamus petition in the court of appeals. The
court ordered the issuance of a building permit indicating that the availa-
bility of an inadequate legal remedy should not prevent the issuance of
the writ. The other original action in the court of appeals52 involved
an abuse of discretion by a city council in rejecting an application for a
nonconforming use. In this case the relator'had exhausted all adminis-
trative remedies under the city ordinances, and it appeared that he had
a dear legal right to the change in classification of his land. The court
issued the writ to compel the granting of a permit to construct.
RIEW BY DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTIONS
This remedy has been effective to determine the validity of zoning
changes prior to the time that any use of affected property is contem-
plated. Where the evidence shows that a plaintiff's property has been
substantially decreased in value by use restrictions, the property owner
affected by the zoning ordinance or amendment may seek a declaration
of rights and injunctive relief without waiting for any further impact
on his property.5" Since the declaratory judgment action is a compre-
hensive remedy, its use is not dependent upon the absence of any other
remedy. Thus even though a mandamus action might be appropriate,
the owner may use the more comprehensive declaratory judgment pro-
cedure at his option.54
50. Culp, Administrative Law and Procedure, Survey of Ohio Law - 1955, 7 WEST. RES.
L Ri. 221, 224 (1956); Culp, Administrative Law and Procedure, Survey of Ohio Law
1959, 11 WBsr. REs. L. REv. 329, 338 (1960).
51. 110 Ohio App. 173, 168 N.E.2d 901 (1959).
52. State v. Woodmansee, 169 N.E.2d 655 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
53. Curtiss v. City of Cleveland, 170 Ohio St. 127, 163 N.E.2d 682 (1959).
54. Shopping Centers of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 109 Ohio App. 189,
164 N.E.2d 593 (1959).
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ATTACKING THE LEGALITY OR REASONABLENESS OF A RULE
UNDER THE OHIO ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
The Administrative Procedure Act55 provides a quick remedy for
challenging the legality or reasonableness of an administrative rule or
regulation. Any person adversely affected by the rule is required to file
a notice of appeal within fifteen days of the order promulgating the rule,
and before the effective date of the rule.
Does this time limitation apply to an attack on a rule which is being
enforced against a party in a specific fact situation or circumstance? The
act indicates that a judicial determination of legality, for example, does
not preclude a person from challenging the legality of the rule in a
specific situation in which the administrative agency is seeking to apply
it. A court of appeals decision recognized the existence of this right in
refusing to apply a rule of the State Racing Commission in a manner
which would result in its invalidity. 6 To avoid rendering the rule in-
valid, the court decided that it should not be literally applied. A literal
application would have required a license suspension which would have
been an unreasonable, arbitrary, discriminatory, and confiscatory act.
APPELLATE PRACTICE RULINGS INVOLVING JUDICIAL
REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
There continues to be some confusion concerning the time element
in perfecting an appeal to the court of appeals from a common pleas
court review of an administrative action. Individual agency statutes
generally state that the appeal is governed by the law applicable to civil
actions. The time fixed for perfecting appeals from the common pleas
court to the court of appeals is that set out in the appellate practice act.57
Both private parties58 and the agencies" have failed to comply with this
time limit, and in such cases the court of appeals is without jurisdiction
to consider an appeal.
Under the Ohio Administrative Procedure Act60 an appeal by the
agency may be taken only on questions of law relating to constitution-
ality, and construction or interpretation of statutes and rules and regula-
55. OHIO REV. CODE 5 119.11 (Supp. 1960).
56. Io re Topper, 109 Ohio App. 289, 165 N.E.2d 19 (1959).
57. OHIO REV. CODE § 2505.07.
58. Seaway Taverns, Inc. v. Board of Liquor Control, 163 N..2d 186 (Ohio Ct. App.
1959). While this appeal is authorized by OHIO REV. CODE § 119.12 (Supp. 1960), it
provides that the appeal shall proceed as in the case of civil actions under §5 2505.01-.45, in-
clusive.
59. State v. Industrial Comm'n, 170 N.B.2d 278 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959). Under the Work-
men's Compensation Act, OHIO REv. CODE § 4123.519, the appeal from the common pleas
judgment is governed by the law applicable to the appeal of civil actions.
60. OHIO REV. CODE S 119.12 (Supp. 1960).
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